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Abstract
The goal of this article is to analyse the representation of the Colombianarmed conflict in the controversial TV series Tres Caínes (2013), which
dramatizes the history of paramilitarism in Colombia through a biographical
story of the lives of the three brothers Castaño Gil, the leaders and founders
of Colombia’s biggest paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colom-
bia (AUC). I argue that Tres Caínes represents the war through a rhetoric that
is close to human rights and transnational justice perspectives, portraying its
characters according to a dichotomy between victim and victimizer. Although
the series purports to take a neutral position in the conflict, and condemns
individual paramilitary leaders, it simultaneously salvages the ideology of
paramilitarism, and thereby indirectly supports the political project of Álvaro
Uribe Vélez. Because of this, despite apparently taking a pacifist stance, the
series constitutes a cultural product that works against peace in Colombia,
and is an example of how humanitarian discourse can be easily exploited in
the service of warmongering and reactionary messaging.
I have always looked for peace, I have always
advocated peace. I have always craved peace.
Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria
The Colombian armed conflict is one of the longest ongoing civil wars of the20th century. At the time of writing it has been waged for sixty-one years
(CNMH, ¡BASTA YA! ). In recent decades, movies, books, and TV series about the
conflict have abounded, each giving a different perspective on the war, and each
provoking different reactions. This article focuses on Tres Caínes, a successful
Colombian TV series that ignited a national debate upon its airing, and came very
close to being cancelled before its conclusion. Tres Caínes narrates the history
of paramilitarism in Colombia, filtering it through the lives of the three brothers
Castaño Gil, Fidel, Carlos, and Vicente, the leaders and founders of Colombia’s
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largest paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [United Self-
Defence Forces of Colombia], or AUC. During their historical trajectory between
the late ’90s and early 2000s, the AUC was responsible for the displacement and
murder of the vast majority of the civilian victims of the war (CNMH, ¡BASTA YA! ).
Unsurprisingly, the airing of a prime time TV series about the AUC’s founders was
met with outraged protests, and it spurred a national debate on how Colombia’s
history of violence should be discussed and represented on national TV, or even if
it should be represented at all.
The goal of this article is to analyse the series and the debate that it sparked,
focusing on how the content of Tres Caínes relates to the history and politics of the
war. Starting from the assumption that there are no objective ways to narrate his-
tory, and much less recent history in a country that is still at war, I will consider
why Tres Caínes represents history the way it does and which political factions
and armed actors benefit from its version of the conflict. Tres Caínes has already
garnered a certain attention from scholars who have underlined how its repre-
sentation of paramilitarism is deeply flawed, and it is sympathetic toward right
wing and nationalist positions (Flórez Fuya; Guerrero Apráez and Amaya Rueda;
Ospina Raigosa). Unlike these scholars, I focus on how Tres Caínes exemplifies
the instrumentalisation of human rights and transnational justice rhetoric for re-
actionary and anti-pacifist purposes. The analysis of the series provides insights
which can potentially be applied to historical and geographical experiences other
than the Colombian conflict, and ultimately highlights the shortcomings inherent
in humanitarian rhetoric.
In order to make my argument, I will analyse which type of historical represen-
tation of the conflict is produced by the series, and for what purposes. My thesis
is that Tres Caínes reproduces the AUC’s ideology while simultaneously condemn-
ing the individual paramilitary leaders. While doing so, it deploys an ideological
representation of the war that is intended to demonise the guerrillas and the FARC
in particular, supporting the political factions that have built their historical legit-
imisation on the anti-FARC sentiment. Because of this, while apparently taking a
pacifist stance, Tres Caínes culturally supports radical anti-FARC positions that still
serve to block the peace process in Colombia.
The article has three sections. In the first, I analyse the public debate over the
series, explaining the arguments from both the critics and the writer of the series,
Gustavo Bolívar. I then identify its ideological elements, isolating the ethical and
moral positions that it expresses, and exploring how the series reconstructs the
relations between the characters and Colombian history. In the second section, I
reconstruct the AUC’s historical trajectory in the Colombian conflict, and compare
the AUC’s ideology with that of Tres Caínes, so to identify similarities and differ-
ences between the two discourses. Finally, in the third section, I focus on the
relations between Tres Caínes’ own discourse and Colombian politics, determining
which groups and actors benefit from the historical representations that the series
displays.
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Victims and Victimizers in Tres Caínes
Tres Caínes belongs to the genre of narconovelas, mainstream TV productionsthat portray the life and adventures of drug traffickers. The genre originated in
Colombia in the early 2000s, and it has gained great national success, becoming
one of the most popular forms of entertainment on TV. Most narconovelas are
produced by the country’s two main networks, Caracol and RCN. In 2012, Escobar,
el patrón del mal was the first narconovela that used the genre to reconstruct
recent Colombian history, in a biographical narrative of the life of Pablo Escobar
and the Medellín Cartel. The cultural phenomenon of narconovelas has surged
thanks to the commercial success of the productions, but it is clearly problematic,
as the armed conflict is still ongoing, and the country has not been pacified, either
militarily or culturally (Trujillo Amaya). While El patrón del mal riled some critics,
public opinion did not consider its storytelling offensive, and generally speaking
the series was well received (Rincón). Later, it enjoyed some international success,
especially after Netflix added to its online catalogue. Tres Caínes followed a year
later. It was produced by Colombian network RCN, that aired it between March
and June 2013 in 70 episodes of approximately one hour each.1 Unlike El patrón
del mal, Tres Caínes was immediately met with dismay. The series faced strong
criticism, and private citizens confronted RCN on social media, demanding the
cancelation of the show and asking private companies to stop airing their ads in
between the episodes’ breaks (Ortiz Franco; Uribe).
The confrontations in the national media saw the series’ writer, Gustavo Bolívar,
debating academics and journalists and justifying the legitimacy of his work and
the decisions of RCN. To synthetize, the criticisms revolved around three main
points:
1. The series is offensive and hurtful toward the victims of paramilitarism, as it
celebrates the lives of their victimizers. Not enough space on the screen is
given to the victims, and the correct way to represent paramilitarism would
be from their perspective, and not the Castaños’.
2. The series represents paramilitarism as the consequence of the murder of
the Castaños’ father by the guerrilla, and thus, paramilitarism is portrayed
as an understandable reaction against the violence of the war.
3. The series is particularly damaging for children, as it exposes them to vi-
olence, and the goal of RCN should be to educate future generations and
to spread pacifism, not to feed them violence to increase its ratings (this
argument was central to the protests on social media).
Bolívar expressed his counter arguments in a debate that aired on Semana en
Vivo in March 2013 (Revista Semana). These were:
1 The DVD version is composed of 80 episodes of roughly 40 minutes each.
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1. The show gives space to the representation of the victims, and it does not
exclude them from the narration. The critics should wait to watch the
whole series, as the victims’ perspective becomes central in the late part of
the show.
2. The goal of the series is to condemn violence in any form, and the murder
of the Castaño’s father shows how vengeance is not the solution to the
violence, as it converts the victim into a monster.
3. The series aims to educate the viewers, as it is only by getting to know
its history that the country can avoid repeating the same mistakes. The
presence of violence in the story is inevitable when talking about a war.
To analyse this debate we should start by considering Tres Caínes’ narrative
form: the biography. The writers represented the story of three specific individuals
in order to describe the war through their personal lives. What characterizes this
style of storytelling is that every person or event is portrayed in relation to the
Castaños, who constitute the center of the story. Thus, the biographical focalization
makes it impossible to represent history as a conflict or tension between different
actors, as the only actors that we acknowledge are the Castaños, while all others
merely serve as foils for the protagonists’ actions. While critics attack the writers
for making their story about the Castaños, it should be noted that their desire to
see a story about the victims would undertake the same style of narration, as it
would simply switch the centre from the Castaños to their victims. On this issue,
both the critics and Bolívar expressed the same worldview, because they divided
the subjects they were discussing into victims and victimizers, and the argument
stems from the choice to make one or the other the centre of the narration.
The focus on the category of victim by Bolívar and his critics hints at the nor-
malization of the concept in Colombian political discourse. This rhetoric represents
the war through the binary dichotomy between active and passive actors—which
is to say victimizers and their victims. The use of this distinction and the rearticu-
lation of the events under this paradigm are key elements to Tres Caínes. This logic,
which is normally associated with, but not exclusive to, non-violent and humani-
tarian movements, aims to exclude the perspective of armed actors as illegitimate,
to draw a line between those who suffer and those who abuse, rearticulating any
relation in the war through a paradigm that constantly distinguishes between the
powerful and the powerless, the executioner and the martyr. The victims’ status is
an identity that it is given, and as such it cancels other complexities and nuances
that it is important to be aware of in order to understand the people who make
up the groups of victims and victimizers. Crucially, it must be emphasized that
the armed actors would not kill randomly, but would rather select their victims
according to their particular military and political project. The social, racial, and
political origins of the conflict’s victims is what made them a target in the first
place, but they are erased once the only identity that is recognized is the identity
of victim. Similarly, the armed actors are also conflated together in the category
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of the victimizers, as the only feature that describes them is their violence against
the victims, and not their political position within the conflict. In the series, this
is very clear from the start, as among the victims we see the members of the
Castaño family who disapprove of the three brothers’ actions. In episode 74,2 the
Castaños’ mother even participates in a demonstration in support of the victims
of paramilitarism, and she steps on the podium to ask for understanding and
forgiveness from the crowd, claiming victim status for herself and her family. She
is represented as a victim of the Castaños, and she identifies as such.
This concept of victim is not originally from Colombia, but constitutes a key
part of the contemporary framework for analysing conflicts from a human rights
and transnational justice perspectives. The philosopher Daniele Giglioli argues
that the victim paradigm is designed to deny the conflictual nature of politics.
According to Giglioli victims are used to give moral superiority to the discourse
that purports to support them, so as to stifle debate by demanding sympathy
for them, and accusing conflictual discourses of being the cause of victimization
(111–12). In Colombia, the victim discourse has become the hegemonic rhetoric
to describe the conflict, particularly from institutional and official positions. How
this discourse clashes against alternative perspectives has already been described
by anthropologists Pilar Riaño-Alcalá and María Victoria Uribe, who have worked
as members of the Grupo de Memoria Histórica as part of the first state-sponsored
effort to reconstruct the memories of the war from the survivors’ perspective. As
they noted, the victim is a political subject that necessarily homogenizes all differ-
ent survivors of the violence. Moreover, it only acknowledges those who express
themselves in accordance to its rhetoric, celebrating their vulnerability, weakness,
and impotence. Anybody who might privilege other emotions, perspectives, or
calls for action, would not be acknowledged as an authentic victim or as a victim
at all, and her testimony would be canceled or stigmatized.
Some critical accounts of Tres Caínes have underlined how the victims in the
series are mainly represented as passive subjects, but it should be noted that
this is implicit in the very concept of victim: the victims are categorized by the
violence they suffered, and they exist strictly in relation to their victimization, as
passive figures (Van Dijk 13). By their nature victims cannot have an active role,
and all they can do is support the action of somebody else, usually the State, to
punish the victimizers. Thus, the victim can only exist in a very specific space, a
space of inaction. Any transition from such space would imply the loss of victim
status. This aspect is crucial to understanding the ideology behind the series: the
storyline is constructed as the Castaños’ transition from victims to victimizers, and
the family serves as a metaphor for the entire country.
In the first episode we are introduced to the Castaño family enjoying a peaceful
existence in the countryside. The patriarch works on his farm, and Carlos is a
sweet little boy who helps him out. It is hinted that Fidel probably traffics cocaine,
but violence is absent from family life. The equilibrium is broken when a local
2 This reference and all others throughout the article will refer to the DVD version of the show.
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group of guerrillas kidnap the older Castaño for ransom, and even though they
get paid, they kill the old man. The Castaños then swear, literally on their father’s
grave, to exterminate every guerrilla in the country. The killing of the father serves
as the historical origin of the war. The Castaños are all turned into victims by
the attack, and a first division among the family emerges when some of them
choose to stay victims, while the others take action and turn into victimizers.
This is metaphorically extended to the entire country, as the conflict expands as
a conflict among brothers. The following fights and murders between the three
brothers intensify this element of the narrative logic. The guerrillas fall outside it
as they do not belong to the family: their actions do not arise from a previous
victimization, and they represent a greater evil that first creates victims and then
forces them into taking action.
Action is the greatest sin in the face of violence. In the series, this idea is artic-
ulated through a Christian rhetoric that goes hand in hand with the humanitarian
perspective described above. The ideology of victimhood not only homogenizes all
victims regardless of their history, it does the same with the victimizers. The vio-
lence that the brothers unleash in their war is not considered to be different from
the violence of the guerrilla or of the state forces who supported paramilitaries.
Violence is de-historicized by being discussed in simple moral terms. The first
episode shows the Castaños as good people, and not because of what they have
done, but exactly because they have done absolutely nothing: their passivity and
vulnerability gives them high moral status, which is then broken when they decide
to react. In Tres Caínes, the absolute refusal of violence is mandatory for a person
to be “good”, and martyrdom is the only appropriate form of self-defence. This
concept is clearly articulated in a conversation between Romualda, the youngest
sister of the Castaños, and her boyfriend Aurelio. They both sympathize with the
Left, and are in contact with a university professor who is close to a guerrilla
group. Following the death of her father, Romualda rejects violence as a way
to achieve equality, but Aurelio still believes that the armed struggle is the only
possible solution for an equal Colombia. Romualda objects that:
Todo los seres humanos tenemos derecho a la vida, y nadie es quien para
arrebatarle a uno ese derecho. Aurelio, después de enterrar a mi papá, yo
me di cuenta que quiero hacer parte de una revolución pacífica, así como la
que hizo Jesucristo, como hizo Gandhi allá en la India. Pero claro, ustedes
no entienden eso. Ustedes creen que la única manera es con las armas. (Tres
Caínes, ep. 3)3
[All human beings have the right to life, and nobody can take that away.
Aurelio, after having buried my father, I realized that I want to take part in
a peaceful revolution, like Jesus, or Gandhi in India. But obviously you don’t
get that. You all think that the only way is with weapons.]
Aurelio is later moved by her words, and distances himself from the professor. But
when the Castaños find out their sister is dating a communist, they arrange for his
3 All the translation from Spanish are mine.
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murder. The death of Aurelio sanctifies him as a victim: he is close to becoming a
monster, but his love shows him a peaceful way forward. The fact that he disarms
himself is what turns him into a martyr.
According to this perspective, weakness and vulnerability should be embraced
as a sort of badge of honour, because they grant an unimpeachable moral status.
The only appropriate form of (in)action is to ask for state protection. Moreover,
violence is perceived as the only cause of the war, because the conflict starts with
a victimization that is divorced from its sociohistorical causes, starting a cycle of
revenge which cannot end without a moral redemption. Violence cannot be an
instrument to achieve a goal, due to the fact that its use corrupts the original
purpose. As a consequence, society is divided between the passive, who are good,
and the active, who are evil. In between them stands the State, the only entity that
can legitimately use violence. Therefore, the victimizers are all those who fight
outside of the State, but also those inside the State who abuse their position to
pursue self interest. The latter are defined as “corrupted”. Bolívar clarified this last
point during a formal ceremony in Congress that honored the memory of a victim
of paramilitarism. On that occasion, while confronting criticism of Tres Caínes
Bolívar asserted that “corruption” was the original cause of the war (“Libretista”).
Bolívar’s vision of history is fairly simple, as he rejects any socio-economic
analysis, he simply finds answers by identifying an original sin that is responsible
for moral decay of society. Applying this ideology to Colombia, the conclusion is
that neither the violence nor the actors can be analysed from a social or political
perspective, as their immorality is the only element that counts. In an interview
with El Tiempo, Bolívar sought to defend Tres Caínes from its critics:
La violencia existe en Colombia no por la televisión, sino por una ecuación:
hay guerrilla porque hubo corrupción en el Frente Nacional, y hubo parami-
litares porque hubo guerrilla, y esa ecuación no me la aceptan ni la guerrilla,
ni los paras, ni los corruptos. (Posada Tamayo)
[In Colombia, violence does not exist because of TV, but because of a for-
mula: there is a guerrilla because there was corruption in the National Front,
and there were paramilitaries because of the guerrilla. And nobody accepts
this formula of mine: neither the guerrilla, nor the paramilitaries, nor the
corrupted.]
He thus conflates the guerrilla, the paramilitaries, and a group which is only de-
fined by a moral connotation, “the corrupted”, into the category of the victimizers.
Bolívar also victimizes himself, as he points out how the victimizers do not accept
his analysis, which puts him in opposition against them, and thus, closer to the
victims. It is important to note that Bolívar is far from being a right-wing figure.
He is currently a Colombian senator who was elected for the leftist party coalition
Lista de la Decencia. His political positions read as a blend between populist and
Christian rhetoric, in line with a mainstream humanitarian call for pacifism while
condemning all armed actors as immoral or corrupt.
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To give a clearer example of how the war is discussed on the show, let us
consider this scene: in episode 69, the character of Jairo, who represents the
murdered Colombian comedian Jaime Garzón, decides to use his TV show to
document the struggle of a group of war victims, and he interviews Gloria, a
political activist (based on Gloria Cuartas). During the interview, she offers the
following analysis of the conflict:
Gloria: La mayoría de estas personas [referring to the crowd that surrounds
her] son víctimas. Pero son poquitas para las miles y miles que han dejado
ambos grupos en todo el país.
Jairo: Duro, sí o qué?
Gloria: Sí. Más que duro, infame. Y le han matado sus familiares. Y se los
han matado porque sí. Por sospecha, por capricho. O por lo que es peor:
por sed de sangre. Porque esa, en últimas, es el único motivo que tiene este
conflicto absurdo, infame.
[Gloria: The majority of these people are victims. But they are few compared
to the thousands that both groups [guerrilla and paramilitaries] have left
throughout the country.
Jairo: That’s tough, isn’t it?
Gloria: Yes, it is awful. And they killed their families. And they killed them
just for the sake of it. Because of suspicion, or on a whim. Or what’s even
worse, for their thirst of blood. Because that, ultimately, is the only reason
behind this absurd, heinous conflict.]
Tres Caínes and AUC
Having analysed Tres Caínes’ ideological positions, in this section I compare theshow’s narrative with the AUC’s historical trajectory, in so doing seeking to
determine which elements of paramilitarism the show chooses to overlook or even
hide. As mentioned before, one argument of the show’s critics was that to portray
the Castaños’ war as revenge for the death of their father acted as an apology for
paramilitarism. The show does portray paramilitarism as a reaction to an attack,
and thus, a form of self-defence. This justification for the events was not created
by Tres Caínes, having originally been provided by the Castaños themselves, Carlos
in particular.
As the AUC’s leader and spokesperson, Carlos Castaño was charged with taking
advantage of interviews and public appearances to seek political and moral legit-
imation for paramilitarism, and just like Tres Caínes, he portrayed his life and the
life of his family as a metaphor for the country and the conflict (Ronderos 302–11).
Castaño adopted the position of victim by locating the origin of his struggle in his
father’s murder, and extended this origin to the entire organization, reconstructing
the history of the AUC as a defensive reaction against the guerrilla (Aranguren
Molina 83). While Castaño would obviously not agree with Tres Caínes’ apology
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for passivity and martyrdom, the idea that it was an original act of victimization
that had sparked their paramilitarism was originally his. In Castaño’s discourse,
the AUC became avengers, but also protectors of the “good people” against the
savagery of the communists. According to him, paramilitarism was a spontaneous
movement that arose due to the lack of state protection for the citizens of northern
and western Colombia, who had to take up arms to defend themselves against the
guerrilla. Because of this, the AUC conceived themselves as allies of the Colombian
state, their presence as temporary, and intended to lay down their weapons once
the State was able to retake control of the country (Angarita Cañas et al. 189–210).
Later in 2008, Salvatore Mancuso, who was one of AUC’s highest leaders, changed
the story, claiming that the AUC were in fact “the state’s illegitimate son”, and that
their entire trajectory was sparked and supported by the State to fight the guerrilla
and any other leftist force in Colombia (Angarita Cañas et al. 196). The reason
Mancuso gave this declaration was that the Colombian government had decided
to extradite him to the US along with other incarcerated ex-paramilitary leaders,
despite agreements that they brokered with the Administration between 2003 and
2006 (Daly 64–71; Ronderos 722–26).
The portrayal of the AUC as a spontaneous reaction to the guerrilla is con-
structed by excluding the issues of class and land from the history of the Colom-
bian conflict. Moreover, it falls short of explaining why the vast majority of the
victims of paramilitarism were civilians, and not guerrilla members. According to
the data of the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH), among all armed
actors (guerrilla, paramilitaries and state forces), paramilitary groups were respon-
sible for the death of 94,754 civilians, or roughly 70% of the total non-armed
victims whose death could be attributed to an actor (C. Romero). During their tra-
jectory, paramilitaries (paras) focused on mass killing and forced displacement of
civilians, and mainly targeted rural population (campesinos). Their other main goal
was the selective targeting of civilians, activists, journalists, politicians and any-
body who could be associated with leftist movements (CNMH, Todo pasó; Steele).
Actual confrontation with guerrilla forces was much less frequent and much less
successful, as the paras never focused their strategy on the military destruction
of the guerrilla, aiming instead at marginalizing them socially and politically, as
I discuss below. This is an important distinction between guerrilla and paramil-
itarism, as the former would focus on military actions against state forces, and
on the development of a social base among the rural population, while simulta-
neously targeting the middle and upper rural class with extortion and kidnapping
for ransom (Leech 36–67). Unlike the paramilitaries the guerrilla did not consider
civilian massacres an integral part of their strategy. This is not to deny that both
FARC and ELN have massacred civilians, but they did not conceive of theirs as a
war against certain segments of the rural population, which is the reason for the
disparity between the massacres attributed to the guerrilla and the paramilitaries.
However, guerrilla groups have been known to target civilian communities when
they believed them to be working with the enemy. And moreover, they often
showed disregard for civilian casualties by conducting attacks against their foes
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in the proximity of villages, or by using car bombs in densely populated areas
(CNMH, Tomas y ataques 222–26; Leech 122–40).
More than a reaction to the guerrilla, paramilitarism in Colombia should be
understood as a military and political project in defense of the status quo. Paramil-
itarism developed to avoid any redistribution of resources in favour of the poor
population, and to salvage the privileges of the heterogeneous elites who financed
it: landowners, industrialists, US-American and Colombian corporations, and drug
traffickers. What these actors had in common was the need to avoid an expansion
of the guerrilla, which might “tax” them or take away their land, and a general
fear of trade unions and political organizations that might mobilize workers and
peasants against them (M. Romero). Among the paramilitary supporters were also
small landowners who feared kidnapping, but in terms of funding and support for
paramilitarism this latter group was almost irrelevant when compared to the elites
(Ronderos 32–140).
Paramilitarism developed in the ’80s, with regional, small groups throughout
western and northern Colombia, the most relevant being the group in Puerto
Boyacá led by Henry Pérez, and the group in Córdoba led by Fidel Castaño. The
Castaños were already deeply involved in drug trafficking and organized crime
even before the murder of their father, and they later created a paramilitary group
with the support of drug traffickers and elites in the province of Córdoba to fight
guerrillas and accumulate land for themselves and their allies. In this phase,
paramilitaries defended local interests, utilizing terror and selective killings to
marginalize the growth of the guerrilla and the Left in the region. In the late ’80s,
they focused on the killing of members of the Unión Patriótica (UP), the FARC’s
political party. To allow the FARC to have a political party had been one of the
terms of the 1985 peace accord between FARC and the Colombian government.
By exterminating thousands of the party’s members, from the leadership to its
base, they successfully pushed the FARC toward more radical positions, as they
made it clear that communists could not safely participate in democracy and
would be exterminated if they ever disarmed (CNMH, Todo pasó). The Castaños
also targeted towns and communities who voted in members of UP with terrorist
attacks, acquiring a reputation for brutality and the use of beheadings to intimidate
the campesinos (see Guarín and Ramírez Ortiz).
After the death of Fidel Castaño, who may even have been killed by his broth-
ers, paramilitarism evolved into a more powerful force. The remaining Castaños
first expanded into the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (ACCU), and
in 1997 created the umbrella organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).
The AUC could count on the tacit support of the army, much of the State, and the
country’s elites. Its sudden growth in the mid and late ’90s was favoured by the
CONVIVIR national programme that started in 1994 on the initiative of Álvaro Uribe
Vélez among others. At the time, Uribe was governor of the Antioquia department,
who in 2002 became the country’s president.
The CONVIVIR were armed groups of private security whose status as self-
defence forces was recognized by the State, which granted private citizens the
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right to arm themselves against the guerrilla. The programme was a de facto
legitimization of paramilitarism, and the CONVIVIR were all co-opted or completely
constituted by paramilitary groups (M. Romero). Moreover, after the collapse of
the big drug cartels in the early ’90s, paramilitaries shifted from being financed
by drug traffickers to becoming drug traffickers themselves (Guizado Camacho).
Most of their funds came from trading in cocaine, while donations and extortion
made up the rest of their revenue. At their height, they could count on around
twenty thousand fighters, spread throughout Colombia with the exception of the
FARC strongholds in the country’s southeast. Between the late ’90s and early
2000s, they fought a bitter territorial war against FARC and ELN, and the mass
killing of civilians became their core strategy. The massacres were conducted with
exceptional cruelty in order to terrify the population. The violence displaced large
numbers of civilians, making it impossible for the guerrilla to develop a social base
in the areas that they wished to control.4
The AUC made great efforts to politically justify their struggle. They rhetor-
ically defended their war by denying accusations regarding the brutality and in-
discriminate nature of the killings. They claimed that all victims were guerrillas,
and that executions with firearms were the only method they used to kill. Carlos
Castaño would describe the guerrillas as soldiers by night and farmers by day,
claiming that they would hide among the rural population to make it impossible
for their enemies to target them (Caracol Televisión). Moreover, the AUC and the
Army accused NGOs, politicians, journalists, and activists of being bought by the
guerrilla, turning all opposition to them into a military target by constructing a
gigantic and hideous enemy supposedly hiding in civilian clothes and working to
destroy Colombia (Angarita Cañas et al. 202–06).
To return to Tres Caínes, the first element to consider are the similarities
between the AUC’s historical discourse and the storytelling in the show. These are
hardly surprising, given that the series’s historical sources are the paramilitaries
themselves: the show utilizes the paramilitaries’ testimonies that were given after
their surrender as established by the law of Justicia y Paz [Justice and Peace] in
2005. Moreover, it is obvious that Carlos Castaño’s memoirs are also a source
(Aranguren Molina). Because of this, while the series makes efforts to paint the
brothers in a negative light, it inevitably tells their stories from the paramilitaries’
perspective.
In the first episodes, for example, the brothers are shown to prevent the
kidnapping of landowners in Córdoba, thereby gaining their gratitude and support.
While we also see how the Medellín Cartel financed the brothers, it is striking that
the paramilitaries are portrayed as responding to the legitimate fears of their
compatriots. As the narrative progresses, the viewer is always presented with clear
differences between the Castaños and the FARC. Every action of the Castaños
4 See CNMH (La masacre) and also García de la Torre and Aramburo Siegert for a detailed account
of the paramilitaries’ strategies in Urabá. The role that land and territory played in the conflict has
also been reconstructed by Alejandro Reyes Posada.
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is constructed as a reaction to the guerrillas’ actions, and FARC members are
represented as cruel, sadist fanatics, who kill and destroy for no reason. In the
show’s world of dichotomies, the guerrilla are the opposite and complement of
the Castaños—the permanent living origin of all the brothers’ actions. In episode
58, they attempt to kidnap the brothers’ family, including their mother who has
already broke off all relations with Carlos and Vicente and is attempting to live an
honest life. The incident serves to justify the escalation of violence of the AUC. In
episode 59, Carlos, furious because of the failed attack on his family, decides to
intensify military operations with these words:
¡Venganza! Eso es lo que quiero, ¡venganza! Les vamos a matar todos los
familiares al secretariado de las FARC. Que se den cuenta que cometieron el
error más grande de sus vidas. ¡Se metieron con mi mamá! ¡Se metieron con
mis hijos! ¡Se metieron con mi familia!
Vamos pueblo por pueblo averiguando quiénes son sus familiares. Los vamos
a sacar, los vamos a descuartizar. Le vamos a dar la orden a la tropa: que
les corten las cabezas y que juegen fútbol con ellas. Los vamos a llenar de
terror. A los colaboradores les vamos a acabar los negocios, les vamos a
descuartizar los hijos, les vamos a violar las hijas.
¡Y no vamos a parar ahí! ¡Vamos a pedir más sangre! A los periodistas que le
ayudan a esos facinerosos, los vamos a matar también. Las ONG que vinieron
a este país a decirnos cómo es que tenemos que manejarnos, diciéndole a
la comunidad internacional que los malos somos nosotros, a ellos también
los vamos a matar.
[Revenge! Revenge! That’s what I want! We are going to kill the families of
the FARC secretariat. They are going to learn this was the biggest mistake
in their life. They came after my mother! They came after my children, my
family!
We go from town to town and we find their relatives. We’re going to root
them out and dismember them. We will give the order to the troops: they
must cut off their heads and play football with them. We are going to fill
them with terror. We are going to destroy the businesses of those who
collaborate with the guerrilla. We will rip their sons apart, and we will rape
their daughters.
But we won’t stop there! We are going to demand more blood! We are going
to kill the journalists who help those insurgents; the NGOs who came to this
country to tell us what to do, and who told the international community that
we are the bad ones, we are going to kill them as well.]
The scene represents the AUC’s transition from a small-scale war to a massive
deployment of troops and perpetration of massacres throughout Colombia. Playing
football with campesinos’ heads was an actual practice in the AUC massacres,5 and,
along with the attacks on journalists and NGOs, it serves as a reference to locate
5 The analysis of the survivors’ testimonies shows patterns of brutality in the paramilitary’s mas-
sacres, which hints to the fact that the atrocities were much more organized than it would appear.
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the discourse historically. While the father’s death was a myth produced by the
Castaños themselves, the events leading to this scene are entirely the product of
the show’s authors: the attempted kidnap never happened, and the intensification
of the AUC’s terrorism was not due to Carlos Castaño’s victimization.
It is important to underline that the use of fiction in a historical drama is not
wrong per se, as what matters is the interpretation of the historical phenomenon
that the drama wants to display. Because of this, when analysing such a product
the attention should not be focused on what is told, and whether or not it is “true”,
but why it was told, what kind of order and relation in the events it produces, and
why it was told in a certain way rather than another. The point is not to determine
what is fiction and what is real, but how the portrayal of a certain event determines
the final understanding of the historical phenomenon in question. In this case the
fictional portrayal of paramilitarism is constructed as the violence of victims, who
were corrupted because of what was done to them.
Comparison of the rhetoric of the show with that of the historical paramilitaries
reveals affinities between the two. But the same cannot be said of the guerrilla.
Both the show and the AUC reconstruct the origin of paramilitarism as the original
victimization of the paras. While the show does not concede that this justified
the eventual reaction of the AUC, it maintains that such reaction had this original
cause. Moreover, Tres Caínes denies that the existence and behaviour of the
guerrilla is due to sociohistorical causes and it represents the FARC as essentially
evil. On the contrary, the guerrilla portray their own struggle as motivated by
sociohistorical circumstances, and they consider the paramilitaries to be the savage
reaction of the oligarquía (Angarita Cañas et al. 167–86). Far from taking a neutral
position between the two, Tres Caínes reproduces the paramilitary representations
of the conflict. The ideological construction of the AUC as victims serves to erase
the social origin of their own victims and the real reasons for their killing. The
series accepts the justifications of Carlos Castaño, who claimed the AUC were only
after guerrillas and their supporters. While Tres Caínes does make clear that many
victims were civilians, their deaths are put down to the paras’ mistaken belief that
they were guerrillas. Because of this, while Tres Caínes morally condemns the
paramilitaries, it also accepts their explanation and version of events.
If we consider the AUC to have been the frontline fighters of a counter-
revolutionary program, the social origin of their victims matters, because they
were targeted on the basis of their intersecting characteristics of class and rural
location. The erasure of this allows for a representation of the victims as individ-
uals who are disconnected from Colombia’s social structure: in Tres Caínes, this is
evident when the show portrays the marches of the victims who chant “the victims
have a name and a face”. Support for victims is demonstrated by reconstructing
some of their personal lives, while simultaneously disregarding the social origins
that made them targets. The victim category blurs any possible distinction among
the victims, to the point that it is logical to consider the Castaños’ mother a victim
as well, just like the displaced campesinos. If what binds the victims together is
simply the suffering, and not its historical causes, then there is no need to qualify
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that pain in political terms, as the ethical position against violence is sufficient to
account for all those affected.
When committing their massacres, the paramilitaries would pretend to select
the campesinos based on their allegiance, utilizing informers or lists of names to
identify the “subversives”. But the number of their victims and the testimonies
of the survivors clearly show that even though they were keen to kill the actual
guerrilla supporters, they would butcher neutral civilians as well (see CNMH, La
masacre). This is because from the AUC’s perspective the campesinos were not
neutral at all. They conceived of the masses as part of the body that was the
nation in which the “subversion” (any type of leftist movement, whether armed or
not) was a “cancer” to be extracted. The rural population had to be “cleansed”,
educated, terrified, and steered toward capitalism by means of violence, which
was simply a tool to use whenever it was needed (Ronderos 473–77). Tres Caínes
reconstructs the events by pretending to take a pacifist stance, against all forms of
violence, but favours paramilitarism while condemning the individual paramilitary
leaders. Moreover, while claiming to support the victims “who have a name and a
face”, it erases their origin, blurring the distinctions and taking a political position
that is far from neutral.
Tres Caínes, Uribismo, and Peace
Having highlighted Tres Caínes’ ideological components through how it repro-duces the AUC’s discourse, I now turn to the relationship between the series
and Colombian politics. To understand Tres Caínes’ political significance it is nec-
essary to locate it within the conflict. To synthesize the previous arguments, I have
asserted that:
1. Tres Caínes portrays paramilitarism as a reaction to the violence of the guer-
rilla, and it considers the discourse of Carlos Castaño and other paramilitary
leaders a legitimate historical source.
2. By failing to include class and land in its story, Tres Caínes does not find
any other reason for the conflict than the evil of men, and it reconstructs
history by focusing on the morality of individuals.
It is important to consider who benefits from this historical representation, and
who does not. I shall term Tres Caínes’ ideological position paramilitarism without
paramilitaries, to underline how the series reproduces the AUC’s representation of
the conflict while simultaneously condemning the members of the organization
on a moral level. This ideology is connected to the phenomenon of Uribismo—
the political project of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who was president of Colombia from
2002 until 2010, and remains a very important and influential figure. Uribe came
to power after Andrés Pastraña, who had negotiated a failed peace accord with
the FARC in 1998. Uribe had already identified himself as a fierce enemy of
the guerrilla when he was governor of Antioquia, during which time he was the
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originator of the CONVIVIR project that allowed the growth of paramilitarism
in the ’90s. He ran his presidential campaign expressing a radical position in
terms of peace: he excluded any possible dialogue with the FARC and proposed
a renewed military offensive against them with the full support of the US. Under
Uribe, the AUC were recognized as a political actor and they demobilized between
2003 and 2006. During this process, it was revealed that the Congress had been
heavily infiltrated by the AUC, and that roughly a third of the congressmen had
ties with the paras, a scandal that became known as parapolítica. Moreover, the
negotiations between Uribe’s government and the AUC proposed a demobilization
that would have granted amnesty to the entire group, left the AUC commanders
most of their wealth, and even allowed them to form official political parties and
NGOs. The process failed because of national and international outcries, when it
became clear that the AUC had infiltrated the parliament and were being offered
generous concessions (Daly 60–71; Ronderos 722–26). The scandal worsened the
position of those paramilitary commanders who had already surrendered, because
the public pressured the Supreme Court into establishing that war crime tribunals
were needed to investigate the paramilitaries and their connections. AUC members
who refused to give a complete and truthful testimony could be severely punished
and prosecuted for their crimes. Shortly later, Uribe extradited all the high-ranking
commanders to the United States on drug trafficking charges, making it impossible
for them to testify about their allies in the military, the government, and the
country’s elites (Daly 60–71; Angarita Cañas et al. 103–24). A significant number of
paramilitaries did not demobilize, reorganizing instead (Daly). Over time, members
of the Uribe government have been shown to have a significant number of links
with the AUC and to be implicated in war crimes against the civilian population
(Casey).
While fighting the FARC, Uribe devoted his propaganda machine to demonize
the guerrilla, and to focusing attention on himself as a strong, political, and military
leader in the war against the FARC, which was painted as a conflict between good
and evil. Fabio López de La Roche has proposed the term anti-fariano (anti-FARC)
to describe a new sense of national identity that formed in Colombia under Uribe,
with the citizen conceived as a member of a national community in opposition
to the FARC (Las ficciones). The entire concept of Uribismo revolves around the
contrast between good Colombians and the guerilla, with the latter defined as
“terrorist” without admission of any possible historical or political causes (Angarita
Cañas et al. 57–102). As for the paramilitaries, Uribe officially declared them to
be terrorists and narcoterrorists, no different to the guerrilla, but he also pointed
out that they arose because of the guerrilla’s violence (Angarita Cañas et al. 107–
09). Public condemnation of the AUC allowed the State to hide its true links with
paramilitarism, while positioning itself as the only legitimate actor in the conflict.
This depiction of the AUC as terrorists ended during the peace process, as the
government needed to acknowledge them as political actors in order to reach a
negotiation, but it remained valid for those who refused to demobilize (Angarita
Cañas et al. 221–27).
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In his speeches, Uribe denied the existence of political motives behind the
guerrilla’s actions, as he considered all armed actors to be the product of either
evil or greed, as expressed by the labels of terrorist and narco respectively. Because
of this, Uribe did not concede that the term war could be used to describe violence
in Colombia. Rather, Colombia suffered from the presence of “narcoterrorists”, who
falsely claimed political cause to legitimize themselves. Tres Caínes reproduces this
same depiction of the conflict. While it acknowledges the existence of the war, it
maintains that the armed actors were simply fighting out of evil or greed.
As I mentioned before, while the show represents the FARC as pure evil without
any nuance, the Castaños are initially shown in a tragic and sympathetic light, due
to their recent victimization. Their moral decay progresses through the episodes,
as they complete their transition toward victimizers. This is true for all three
brothers, but it is particularly noticeable in Carlos, who unlike his brothers is less
keen on making money from drug trafficking and is most coherent in his anti-
communist sentiment. In fact, Carlos reaches a sort of moral redemption in the
last episodes, when he tries to dismantle the AUC because he realizes that the
group has become a narcoterrorist organization. As he is trying to make amends,
however, he is killed by Vicente’s man before he can see his project through. An
illustrative scene is in episode 7, when the brothers decide to start their own
cocaine operation to fund their struggle. While they discuss where to build their
laboratories, they have a confrontation:
Fidel: Lo que hace falta es donde montar las cocinas.
Vicente: Las vamos a montar aquí en nuestras propias fincas, Fidel. No nos
vamos a poner ni a comprar ni a alquilar. ¿Entendido? Aquí en nuestras
propias fincas.
Carlos: En la finca de papá. ¿La van a montar en la finca de papá o qué?
Fidel: Es que esta finca no es de papá. Esta finca la compré yo, Carlos. Y yo
hago lo que quiero.
Carlos: ¿Usted va a faltar el respeto a la memoria de papá, Fidel? ¿En esa
finca a donde él trabajó la tierra usted le va a montar una cocina de coca?
Conmigo no cuenten para eso.
[Fidel: All that is left to decide is where to build the labs.
Vicente: We will build them in our own ranches, Fidel. We are not going to
buy them or lease them. Understood? Here in our own ranches.
Carlos: In Dad’s ranch. Are you going to build a lab in Dad’s ranch then?
Fidel: This is not Dad’s ranch. I bought it, Carlos. And I do what I want.
Carlos: You are going to disrespect my father’s memory, Fidel? In this ranch
where he worked the land you are going to build a coke lab? Don’t count on
me for this one.]
The conflict between Carlos and the two brothers regarding cocaine continues
throughout the series. In this exchange the memory of the father, which sym-
bolizes Carlos’s commitment to revenge, is put into contrast with cocaine, which
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symbolizes greed. Cocaine cannot be used to fund a “just” war, because it cor-
rupts the soldiers’ souls, leading them to forget their original motives and head
down a road of moral degradation. As more the show progresses, the AUC and
the brothers get closer and closer to becoming drug traffickers themselves.
The notion of cocaine as morally degrading and depoliticizing does not orig-
inate with the show. It formed a core part of the US State Department and the
Colombian government’s strategy to legitimize the so-called War on Drugs. From
the late ’90s, and particularly after Uribe became president, the United States
and Uribista factions repeatedly asserted that FARC and ELN were drug trafficking
organizations and they should not therefore be considered political actors. This
allowed for the US to invest funds in counter-narcotic efforts in Colombia without
having to acknowledge counterinsurgency operations, and the Colombian state to
claim distance from the paramilitaries (Leech 88–117; Paley 64–98). The anti-drugs
rhetoric rests on a depiction of cocaine as an evil product, charged with symbolic
meanings. According to this rhetoric, cocaine’s power is such that those who use
it to finance a war will lose sight of their goals and become “narcos”—implicitly
not something that could happen if they used other sources of funding. In this
logic cocaine resembles a satanic figure, offering riches at the price of one’s soul.
The moralist view of cocaine concludes that the AUC got into trafficking be-
cause of “greed”. In reality, cocaine has helped paramilitarism just like all the
other resources favoured by capitalist modes of production, such as bananas, oil,
or coffee. The narrative attributes negative values to cocaine because of its illegal-
ity, obscuring the economic relations that regulate its production. The high profit
margins and capitalist nature of cocaine was recognized by the FARC themselves,
who for this reason avoided getting directly involved with it, until the AUC’s growth
made it vital to find more funds to avoid defeat (Norman 649–53).
In reality, the bad reputation brought about by the association with cocaine
motivated Castaño to attempt to cut the links between the AUC and drug traffick-
ing during talks of disarmament with the government. This spurred an internal
struggle within the AUC, leading to Castaño’s death (Ronderos 691–717). The fierce
conflict between Carlos and his ex-allies takes place in the last part of the show.
In episode 74, Carlos, Vicente, and other commanders are discussing sources of
funding for the AUC. Also present at the table is Serna, whose character is inspired
by legendary drug trafficker Diego Murillo Bejarano, aka Don Berna.
Miembro de las AUC: Como ustedes saben, últimamente el frente que nos da
los más recursos son el narcotráfico, las extorsiones, el robo de combustible,
y en última instancia los secuestros.
Carlos: Yo se lo dejé claro la otra vez. Yo acepté que el narcotráfico entrara
a las AUC para financiarnos. Pero yo no estoy de acuerdo con eso. [. . .]
Serna: [. . .] Y yo también te voy a hablar sin tapujos, Carlos. Yo sé que vos y
el Alemán quieren seguir con la línea de atacar primero a la guerrilla. Pero
no todos pensamos de la misma manera. Y vos crees que yo voy a perder
esa plática? ¡No, m’hijo, no está ni tibio! [. . .]
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Vicente: Un momentico, señores. Bajemos el tonito. [. . .] El reclamo que
está haciendo Carlos es un reclamo justo. Nosotros nos hemos dedicado
solamente a exportar coca y abrir nuevas rutas. Pero lo verdaderamente
importante, que es matar guerrilleros, se perdió. Así que, por favor, ¡bajemos
el tono, señores! [. . .]
Carlos: Qué berraquera, Vicente. Ahora resulta que sus nuevos amigos pue-
dan dirigir esto mejor que yo. [. . .]
Ernesto Báez: Carlos, nadie está diciendo que le va a quitar la comandancia.
Todos sabemos que usted es la persona perfecta para manejar esto, cálmese.
Carlos: ¿Cálmese? ¡Cálmese nada, señor! ¡Yo me di cuenta de lo que está
pasando aquí! ¿Ustedes quieren mi cabeza? A ver, vengan por ella. ¡Párese y
venga por ella! ¿O le da miedo? ¿Usted quiere luchar conmigo? Venga a mi
trinchera y yo con mucho gusto le ayudo. ¡Usted se sale de mi trinchera y le
doy bala señor! ¡A usted, a usted, a los que sea! ¡Yo, 20 años dándome bala
con la guerrilla! ¿Y voy a tener miedo de un poco de traquetos?
[AUC member: As you all know, lately our biggest sources of funding have
been drug trafficking, extortion, fuel theft, and finally kidnapping.
Carlos: I already made this clear last time. I accepted that drug trafficking
would enter into AUC to finance us. But I don’t agree with it. [. . .]
Serna: [. . .] I am going to speak plainly as well, Carlos. I know that you and
the Alemán want to keep focusing on attacking the guerrilla first. But we
don’t all think the same way. And you think I am going to lose that dough?
No, son, you are dreaming! [. . .]
Vicente: One moment gentlemen. [. . .] Carlos’ complaint is fair. We have
focused on exporting cocaine and opening new (trafficking) routes, but we’ve
lost sight of what’s really important: killing guerrillas. So please, gentlemen,
let’s watch our tone! [. . .]
Carlos: This is amazing, Vicente. Now it looks like your friends can lead
this better than me [. . .]
Ernesto Báez: Carlos, nobody is saying we take the leadership away from
you, we all know you are the perfect person for the job, calm down.
Carlos: (Yelling) Calm down? There’s no calming down! I see what’s going
on here! Do you want my head? So come for it! Get up and go for it! Or are
you scared? You want to fight with me? Stay by me and I’ll be glad to help
you. But you leave me, I’ll give you a bullet! You, you, and whoever else!
I’ve spent 20 years exchanging bullets with the guerrilla! And you think I am
afraid of a bunch of drug dealers?]
The show thus portrays Carlos’s reservations about trafficking as originating from
moral concerns, while in reality he was aware that to be identified as narcos would
have complicated the demobilization of the AUC. This scene is important because
it constitutes the beginning of the internal conflict between Carlos and the other
commanders. While the others seem to be primarily motivated by greed, Carlos
is represented as more committed to his ideas. This does not constitute an out-
right defence of Carlos Castaño, but it does reinforce the idea that the history of
New Readings 17.2 (2020): 1–23. 18
E. Asoni, Paramilitarism without Paramilitaries
paramilitarism is that of a downfall, that starts from a morally positive origin (that
of the victim) and end corrupted by violence and drug trafficking. When Carlos
attempts to take the reins and lead the AUC away from drugs, he comes to realize
that the war he believed he had to fight has turned him into a monster: just before
he dies, he repents and attempts to make amends. Again, this narrative does not
come from the writer’s imagination. It is exactly how demobilized paramilitaries
described themselves during and after the peace process. They asked for forgive-
ness and reconciliation, while remarking that their motives were good, as they had
been victimized as well (Angarita Cañas et al. 227–33; Tate).
This brings us to my final point, which is that while the show seems to
call for peace, in truth it perpetuates warmongering masked by humanitarian
rhetoric. Given that Tres Caínes characterizes the armed actor in moral terms,
without addressing social and economic reasons for the violence, the only peace
process that it can countenance is one of repentance and forgiveness. The AUC’s
demobilization is atypical for an armed group, as the paramilitaries demobilized
at the peak of their strength, without asking for any political reforms. They did
so because once the US funded the Colombian army to fight the FARC, their
presence became unnecessary and embarrassing for the government, and they
simply surrendered in the expectation of maintaining their wealth and of receiving
full amnesty. This is why they were happy to “repent” and play the victims as they
did. But this was not possible for the guerrilla, which has always been a military
target of the State and is fighting for a revolutionary cause. The peace process
with the Left can only be constructed through a negotiation that acknowledges the
political causes of the violence and addresses them through reform. To call for the
“repentance” of the guerilla is equivalent to supporting military action until their
total destruction, which was precisely Uribe’s strategy during his tenure.
Hence, it is no surprise that Uribe’s far-right party Centro Democrático opposed
the 2016 peace process with the FARC since news of the talks between President
Santos’s government and the guerrilla first became public. Furthermore, RCN,
the news network that aired and produced Tres Caínes, has strongly supported
Uribe’s opposition throughout the negotiations and afterwards (López de la Roche,
“From Uribe’s ‘Democratic Security’”). The Centro Democrático has repeatedly
criticized and attempted to sabotage the process, and the party’s victory in the
2018 presidential elections has put the demobilization of the FARC into a crisis
(Hart; Gill; Kincaid).
A recent example of President Iván Duque Márquez’s crusade against the peace
process has been to insist that sexual crimes against minors not be covered by
the peace process’s tribunals jurisdiction, which would expose FARC members to
ordinary trials for these crimes. Duque stated that, “Nothing, no ideology or
absolutely nothing justifies the vile aggression against the most vulnerable of our
society. We, Colombians, have to invest all efforts in the protection of minors”
(“Cuáles son las tres reformas”). Considering that a common practice among the
FARC was to force female fighters to abort in the case of a pregnancy, as a newborn
could not be taken care of in a mobile military camp, this would expose virtually
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every FARC commander to trial in the ordinary justice system, and it would almost
certainly sabotage the peace process (“Cuáles son las tres reformas”). It is clear
here how the pretense of “siding with the victims” can be used against peace. The
issue exemplifies who truly benefits from the universalization of the category of
victim in Colombia: the current government claims to support all victims but in
reality weaponizes the victims of its enemy in order to silence its own. Moreover,
Duque’s statement closely resembles the rhetoric of Tres Caínes, as the sordidness
of the crime is taken as proof of its lack of ideological, and hence political,
component. This causality is then utilized to demonize and deny the legitimacy
of the enemy as a political actor. Furthermore, because of how the discourse is
constructed, anybody who opposes it can be accused of siding with the criminal
against the victims, and the more vulnerable the victim, the worse such opposition
becomes.
Finally, Tres Caínes narrates the story of the Castaños as a defeat, as the
brothers first lose their family, and then they get killed by each other. But to
consider paramilitarism itself as a failure is a mistake. While the individual leaders
have been killed or arrested, paramilitarism was highly successful in defeating the
guerrilla politically. Through acts of terrorism and genocide the AUC were able
to cut off the relations between the guerrillas and the population, pushing the
FARC toward militaristic positions from which they were unable to achieve the
status of the “people’s army” that they desired. After the guerrillas’ political defeat
came the military offensive that defeated them on the battlefield. The AUC have
ensured that Colombian ruling classes could maintain their position and avoid
revolution. To support the victims from the same political perspectives that lead
to their deaths in the first place is not pacifism: it is another phase of the war, in
which the victors rewrite history to hide the foundations of the system in which
they thrive.
Conclusions
The analysis of Tres Caínes is effective in proving how reactionary ideologiesand military strategies can be delivered through a language that cleaves to
contemporary, widely shared ethical positions and pacifist ideas. The philosophy
of nonviolence and the humanitarian discourse can be rearticulated in war to
support an armed actor, to demonize the enemy, and to move the country away
from peace and an honest, collective conversation about its history of violence.
More often than not, in contemporary geopolitics the victim ideology serves to
justify wars and to grant the status of protector, defender, or avenger to the
attacker, reconstructing history as a timeline where initiators of conflict deserve
what they get by dint of acting first.
My article has attempted to deconstruct a rhetoric which, despite a pretence
of pacifism and empathy, is in fact dangerously close to fanaticism and hate.
It utilizes empathy toward one group to deny it to another and opposes any
dialogue or negotiation with an enemy that can be portrayed as a monster, a
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criminal, or a terrorist. This radical position is always justified by sympathy
toward vulnerability and weakness and accuses any opposition of corruption for
its implicit justification of the victimizer. In Colombia, this implies reinforcing
the hate toward the Guerrilla, who in the political discourse are often more of an
imaginary figure than a real armed actor, and whose cause of existence, rooted in
the violent expropriation of campesino land, is completely forgotten.
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